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The Accidental Cathedral ...
Mijnheer de rector magnifi cus, zeer gewaardeerde toehoorders,
What is sustainable energy? This might seem a simple question 
if we equate it with renewable energy. Renewable energy is 
easy to defi ne. That is the energy that we can harvest directly 
or indirectly from incident sunlight. It is solar energy, in the 
form of solar panels or solar boilers. It is the power from wind 
turbines and hydro dams that tap the energy of the weather 
system. It includes the energy from biomass, which has the 
unique feature amongst renewables that it can be turned into 
liquid fuel. Wave, tidal and geothermal energy complete the 
list. These are the main categories - a simple, relatively short 
list of energy sources.
But the ambiguity of the word sustainable leads to probing 
questions if other forms of energy provision should be 
included or excluded. For instance: does that include nuclear 
energy, which produces no carbon dioxide, but leaves long-
lived nuclear waste and carries operational risks as we see play 
out so dramatically in Japan this week. Does it include fossil 
energy with carbon capture and storage? This would be an 
effective way to deal with the issue of CO
2
 emissions, but some 
argue we are thereby prolonging our dependence on fossil 
fuels and hindering the development of renewables. And is the 
use of biomass for energy purposes sustainable? The answer 
can be yes or no, depending on how effectively we deal with 
issues such as land-use change and competition with food 
production. And what level of energy use is sustainable?
These are just a few questions that illustrate that sustainable 
energy is much less easy to defi ne than renewable energy. 
Where renewable energy is a collection of energy sources, 
sustainable energy only has meaning at the level of the energy 
system. We must consider how all energy sources together meet 
all the energy services the world needs. In the words of the 
Brundtland defi nition, it is energy that “meets the needs of the 
present generation without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs”. 
We all know our energy system at present is not sustainable. 
A full 80% of our energy system runs on fossil fuels - coal, 
oil and gas. This represents a fi nite resource that sooner or 
later must run out. Fossil fuels also produce CO
2
 which is a 
natural greenhouse gas. The prodigious amounts of fossil 
energy we presently use will soon double the level of CO
2
 in 
the atmosphere compared to the pre-industrial level, and this 
is very likely to cause dangerous climate change. So says the 
International Panel on Climate Change and I have no reason to 
doubt the consensus. 
Of the two issues with fossil fuels - resource depletion and global 
warming - one must conclude that global warming is the more 
pressing one. In fact, global warming is a problem precisely 
because the world’s endowment of fossil fuels is so rich. So rich 
in fact that if we burn it all and allow the resulting CO
2
 to build 
up in the atmosphere, we move the climate over a tipping point.
Thus, the prime challenge of sustainable energy is to make 
most of our energy carbon-free. To transform the energy 
system into a “low-carbon” one. 
I mentioned that 80% of the world’s energy supply is currently 
of fossil origin. Of the remaining 20% roughly half is biomass 
and waste. Most of that is in the form of “traditional biomass”, 
that is fi rewood, agricultural residues and dung as used for 
basic energy provision, notably in the developing world. It is a 
form of energy that is intended to be phased out in exchange 
for modern use of (bio)energy. Nuclear energy contributes 
6%; most of the rest is hydropower, a very mature form of 
renewable energy whose potential has already been tapped 
signifi cantly. Wind and modern use of biomass including 
biofuels are approaching the one percent level, and solar 
energy contributes less than a tenth of a percent. Such is the 
make-up of our energy system.1
So it is clear that the energy mix must change. But not just 
that. The world asks for more energy, rather than less. This is 
4
Prof.dr. G.J. Kramer
primarily a consequence of the growth of energy demand in 
the developing world. Perhaps an additional 5 billion people 
will by mid century adopt a pattern of energy use similar to 
ours, which would double energy demand. Over the same 
period IPCC advises that humanity reduces its CO
2
 emissions 
to signifi cantly less than half of what they are today. The 
combination implies that by mid century at least 80% of 
energy must be carbon-free. For this we will mostly have to 
rely on new renewables that presently only contribute at the 
percent level and on carbon capture and storage which is still 
at the demonstration stage. This is the challenge of “sustainable 
energy”. It is the challenge to rebuild the energy system by the 
middle of the century, and prepare for further changes later on. 
It is a challenge of unprecedented magnitude. 
But what is the nature of the energy challenge? Is it a technical 
challenge? Or a social challenge? or both? My chair here at 
Leiden is in the Industrial Ecology department of the Institute 
of Environmental Sciences. Industrial ecology is the science 
that looks at the interplay between the technical and social. So 
this issue is at the heart of what industrial ecology is about and 
key to answering the question what sustainable energy is.
Feasibility
To illustration that change at the level of the energy system is 
not a simple technical matter, I want to cite two early examples 
of people who considered the prospects of running the energy 
system fully on renewable energy.
One of the fi rst of such analyses that caught my eye was a 
paper by John Turner of the US National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory, published in Science back in 1999.2 He considered 
whether solar panels could generate all US electricity. Simple 
arithmetic allowed him to calculate that an area of roughly 
100 by 100 miles packed with panels is enough to produce 
the electricity the US consumes. He then drew the 100 by 100 
mile patch on the map - in empty and sunny Nevada- and 
concluded that it was doable. His paper was called A realizable 
renewable energy future. There is plenty of sunny desert. You 
just need to start manufacturing and installing the panels. 
But strange enough, using similar technical data, the 
environmentalist Ted Trainer concludes the opposite in his 
book Renewable energy cannot sustain a consumer society.3 He 
cites the claim on land as infeasible, and points out the fact that 
solar power is intermittent, so that a lot of excess capacity and 
storage would be needed, making the system impractical and 
unaffordable. He concludes that a world running on renewable 
energy - of whatever type - must inevitably be a simpler world.
Later on I will quote more recent, more elaborate work, but the 
polarization of views as to what is feasible remains very strong to 
this day. It is simply very diffi cult to realistically picture a deeply 
decarbonized energy system. When we do, we are thrown back at 
what Schumpeter called our “pre-analytic visions”. We know the 
answer before we start analysing the question. And when we do 
press on with analysis we will tend to develop cases that support 
our initial intuition. It is in the nature of questions such as the 
one we are presently considering, that the data and context are 
suffi ciently ambiguous to support either view - that it is easy, or 
that it is impossible. 
A mental model 
So we see that opinions are deeply divided about the feasibility 
of the energy transition and whether or not this will require 
a social change. Therefore, people have been searching for 
images; for analogues with challenges that we have successfully 
addressed in the past. 
Those who resist the idea that life style change will be necessary 
usually resort to the analogy of an industrial war effort.4 It is an 
analogy that allows one to illustrate how the numbers of wind 
turbines, solar panels and electric cars that are needed to realize 
the energy transition are similar to the enormous numbers of 
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airplanes, tanks and ammunition that were built during the 
second world war - the common reference. If we could do it 
then, we can do it now - so the argument goes. But I fi nd the war 
analogy ultimately problematic. After all, a war effort and a war 
industry the very opposite what one would deem sustainable. 
Its chief characteristic is a massive, short-term conversion of 
industrial capacity to a single purpose for a number of years. It 
tends to leave unpaid bills behind and an industry sector that 
has been turned upside down. Once the war is won, it has to 
revert back to normal again. But what is that normal state in the 
fi ght against climate change? And will a massive new industrial 
effort bring a sustainable society any closer?5 I am not sure about 
that and I therefore would like to offer a different image. 
I propose we view the rebuilding of the world’s energy system as a 
task that is like that of building a medieval cathedral. The parallels 
I see are the following. Firstly, it took more than a generation to 
build those cathedrals. And those who started the project were 
aware they might not live to see it completed. Secondly, while the 
construction process may have started on the basis of a grand 
design, many of the engineering details had to be worked out 
as work progressed. Thirdly, more often than not the cathedral 
ended up looking quite different from its initial design. But in 
spite of the muddled process of building, when it was fi nished 
the cathedral dominated the towns that had build it. Massive 
and visible; the pride of the town and its people. Fourthly, 
cathedral building was an irresponsible undertaking, fi nancially 
and otherwise. But in the end cathedrals came to be enjoyed as 
buildings that captured the essence of the medieval Christian 
civilization. And lastly, a cathedral is more than just the physical 
thing, the building. It is a cathedral only because of the spiritual 
dimension it also has. They were built to celebrate Christianity, a 
religion that was at the heart of medieval civilization. 
While there are inherent dangers to this sort of parallels and 
I surely don’t want to push it too far, I believe that the fi ve 
aspects of cathedral building I just highlighted are relevant to 
the rebuilding of the energy system. It will take a long time 
to complete; we basically do it for our children, for posterity. 
We have to start now, even if we haven’t sorted out the details. 
The energy system may end up different from how we now 
imagine it. It won’t be cheap, but so long as it doesn’t bankrupt 
us that shouldn’t stop us. It will be massive and visible so we 
must really want it. And fi nally, we will only be able to muster 
the courage to build it if we have a shared vision, a common 
purpose that unite us.
I will occasionally come back to the cathedral metaphor as 
we go along. But before moving on I want to highlight which 
requirements for cathedral building I miss most in relation 
to the transformation of the energy system. On the physical 
side that is our willingness to accept this big new thing in our 
midst. Just think of the opposition there is to wind turbines, 
to carbon storage projects, to nuclear power stations, even 
to large-scale solar farms. We clearly haven’t come to terms 
with the physical presence of a sustainable energy system. On 
the social side we lack motivation, a purpose, a coherent and 
encompassing vision of what sustainable energy is and how it 
fi ts in the larger image of a sustainable society. There can be no 
doubt that we need this in order that we have the motivation to 
build the sustainable energy system and have the wherewithal 
to sustain the effort for as long as it takes to build.
Are our prospects somehow constrained?
So let us review the status of the societal consensus for building 
a sustainable energy system. We saw earlier how opinions on 
the technical feasibility of a renewable energy system were 
polarised. The central question that divides opinion with 
regard to the wider social context is the following:
Are the prospects of humanity somehow constrained because we 
live on a fi nite planet? 
This is such a deep question that over the centuries two 
intellectual traditions have emerged around positive and 
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negative answers to this question. I will refer to those who deny 
constraints as optimists, and to those who believe that the human 
prospect is fundamentally constrained as pessimists. Other 
labels are possible, but for the purpose of this lecture a simple 
distinction in optimists and pessimists is useful. Let me briefl y 
describe these intellectual traditions, starting with the optimists.
The optimist, business-as-usual tradition
The optimist tradition that was created by scientists - or rather 
by the men who fi rst conceived of the concept of science. It is 
common to refer to Francis Bacon in the early 17th Century as 
the starting point of this tradition. In his Novum Organum he 
introduced the modern scientifi c method. Here, and his utopian 
Nova Atlantis he articulated how rational investigation of nature 
was to inspire practical and useful inventions to improve life 
- what we now call innovation. What started out as utopian 
musings, was after an incubation period of one or two centuries 
turned into reality once the industrial revolution took off in 
the 19th century. It further accelerated and diversifi ed in the 20th 
century, spawning the information revolution most recently. 
Within this tradition one anticipates that one of the next 
revolutions will be an energy revolution that will usher in an 
era of cheap and plentiful renewable energy, smart grids, super 
grids and - who knows - nuclear fusion. The tradition sees 
civilization moving onwards and upwards at an ever-increasing 
pace. Technological progress is vital to keep this process going 
but luckily technical progress knows no bounds; science is - to 
quote a famous report6 - the endless frontier. We may run out 
of new continents to discover and exploit, but our ingenuity 
will never run out. In fact, the pace of technological change 
has steadily increased over the centuries. Technology guru 
Ray Kurzweil has said it explicitly: “technological progress is 
exponential, not linear”.7
So we see how innovation-based growth underlies the 
optimist’s vision that constraints will always be overcome by 
new innovations. We cannot tell what these are, but we must 
be confi dent. What was started four hundred years ago by 
scientists has now become a leading paradigm for economists 
and almost a dogma for politicians. There are no limits to 
growth, just limits to imagination.
The pessimist, limits-to-growth tradition
The pessimist reading of history and of the prospects of 
humanity goes back much longer than the optimist tradition. 
After all, growth is only a relatively recent phenomenon. The 
starting point of the modern pessimist tradition is Robert 
Malthus’ famous essay On the Principle of Population. It 
famously explains that unless Man somehow keeps population 
growth in check, the diminishing returns of new agricultural 
land will cause humanity to overshoot the limits of what the 
land will provide. This was the fi rst exposition of the idea of 
Limits to growth which forcefully came back in 1972 with the 
Club of Rome report of that title.8 It made essentially the same 
point as Malthus did, but in an updated and generalized context. 
It works from the basic notion that all resources are fi nite - not 
just agricultural land but also mineral resources and the capacity 
of the earth to absorb waste. According to Limits to Growth, this 
fi nitude must imply that the prospect for growth diminishes 
over time, lest we overshoot the carrying capacity of the earth. 
It is not that the pessimists do not consider technical progress. 
They do. But by contrast to the Baconians it assumes that 
there are diminishing returns of that technical progress so that 
it ultimately is not fast enough to allow growth to continue 
indefi nitely.
The need for a synthesis
When we look at the infl uence these traditions have in the 
real world, we must conclude that the optimist, Baconian 
tradition is the de facto standard world outlook. It defi nes what 
one might call Business as Usual. It defi nes the expectations 
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of the future for virtually all actors: businesses, governments, 
politicians, but also of most people - if not as citizens, 
than certainly as consumers. Neo-Malthusian pessimism 
is perhaps more frequently encountered in academia, but 
isn’t very infl uential today in practical life. In my mind it is 
pointless to ask who is right and who is wrong. The fact that 
both traditions have existed side by side for so long suggests 
that both have a point, and the debate between them is both 
continuous and useful.
I started the investigation of optimism and pessimism because 
I sense a lack of common purpose. The absence of a coherent 
societal vision of how to deal with the energy transition. We 
have seen that the traditions are divided on the nature and 
speed of technical progress and how that impacts the prospects 
for growth on our fi nite planet. The two different perspectives 
translates into opposing pre-analytic visions of the role of 
social or lifestyle change in relation to the dual challenges of 
energy and climate change. 
Because in the Baconian, business-as-usual tradition 
technology is essentially a panacea, social or life style change 
does not need to be actively considered. If, however, one accepts 
that the Malthusians have a point, and that technology will 
ultimately not deliver enough to sustain growth, than change in 
the social sphere becomes inevitable. Malthusians from Malthus 
to the Club of Rome have been careful to present their fi ndings 
neutrally and to leave that conclusion to the audience, but the 
conclusion is so obvious that they are accused of pushing a 
social change agenda nonetheless. We see this play out in the 
polarised political debate around energy and climate change. 
Those who point out that climate change imposes limits are 
often accused of forcing unacceptable lifestyle changes.9
I believe that in order to move forward with the energy 
transition and to build the new energy system - the cathedral 
of our time - we must resolve the tension between the 
Baconian and Malthusian pre-analytic visions of the future. 
We must address to what extent limits are still forced upon us, 
even as technical progress is as rapid as it has been in the past 
centuries.
To see how and why that is the case, let us return to the 
technical side of the debate and consider recent technical 
work that has come out and that describes the technical 
requirements for the energy transition. It will show that even 
when technical innovation and deployment is as rapid as it 
has been in the past centuries, there are still limits to what can 
practically be achieved. 
The physical plan
Earlier I cited the early, simple assessments by Turner and 
Trainer of whether or not the world could be run on renewable 
energy. In the meantime much more detailed work has been 
done. Much of this was triggered by the publication of the 
fourth IPCC assessment report, which made clear that by 2050 
we need at least a four- or fi vefold reduction in the carbon 
intensity of energy delivery. It effectively means that by 2050 
the energy transition should be almost complete, and this 
provides useful focus. The forty years between now and then 
is the sort of timeframe over which anything that can at all be 
built should be a good way towards completion if we put our 
minds to it. It is the timeframe of cathedral building. 
I want to highlight the salient points from four different studies.
The fi rst point is land use and visibility. There is no better 
illustration of the physical impact of massive renewables 
deployment than David MacKay’s masterful book Sustainable 
Energy - without the hot air.10 MacKay is rigorously quantitative 
in his assessment of what a carbon-free Britain looks like. On the 
assumption that Brits will consume as much energy in 2050 as 
they do today he starts allocating resources to match the demand. 
He places wind turbines on the map - on-shore and off-shore. 
He allocates land for biomass; he adds nuclear plants where 
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this is possible - that is where they are today. He puts a carbon 
sequestration infrastructure for ‘clean coal’ in place. He builds 
a tidal energy barrage across the beautiful Severn. This delivers 
about 10 GW - equivalent to ten large power plants - but at the 
expense of fundamentally altering a unique wetland area. 
Taken together, this shows that if renewables are to contribute 
materially, they will be “all over the map”. MacKay speaks about 
the “industrialization of the country side”. There is probably 
no clearer way to indicate what planning battles lie ahead, 
especially when we remind ourselves that even now many 
low-carbon projects are opposed. MacKay’s straightforward 
analysis shows that that must change. A low-carbon energy 
system will be just as visible as the cathedral of a medieval 
town. And no cathedral was ever built in a town of agnostics.
A second point that is suggested by the analysis is that in order 
to fully decarbonize the energy system, one must develop all 
options and all energy resources pretty well to the maximum. 
This includes all renewables, but in many cases nuclear and 
clean fossil energy as well. The more categories one excludes, 
the more daunting the challenge of decarbonisation looks.
A third issue with low-carbon energy is that they require a lot 
of material. Work that René Kleijn, Lauran van Oers, Ester 
van der Voet and myself have done here at Leiden has assessed 
the material intensity for energy service provision and how 
in that respect a low-carbon energy system differs from the 
current fossil-based system.11 The initial results indicate that 
in aggregate low-carbon energy requires more material, more 
metals than fossil energy provision does. This fact challenges 
the tacit notion of the optimists that as the world progresses 
we become ever more effi cient, and that through technical 
progress we need ever less inputs to produce a unit of output. 
When it comes to energy the world will not “dematerialize”, 
but rather the opposite will happen. It reinforces a point we 
easily forget, namely how effi cient and convenient fossil fuels 
are in comparison to the low-carbon alternatives. It also is an 
illustration of the Malthusian idea that technological progress 
doesn’t remove all constraints.
A fourth point in the realization of the physical plan for a 
low-carbon energy system is the time scale over which  it can be 
deployed. On this topic, my Shell colleague Martin Haigh and 
I wrote an opinion article in Nature a year ago.12 Entitled No 
quick switch to low-carbon energy, we estimated the timelines for 
future deployment of new energy technologies on the basis of 
past experience. We argued that scale-up has never been faster 
than one order of magnitude per decade when technologies 
are young, and much slower after they have reached one 
percent of the mix. These empirical laws are essentially the 
outcome of prudent investor behaviour in the development 
of new technology. These “laws” constrain what can be done 
between now and 2030, but beyond that point in time our 
analysis suggests that what can be achieved out to 2050 is fi rst 
and foremost dependent on the market share that new forms 
of energy can capture. In other words, on how the individual 
forms of energy supply can be fi tted into a working system.
Precisely this point was recently addressed in a study called 
Roadmap 2050, published last year by the European Climate 
Foundation.13 It lays out a plan that would allow Europe 
to meet its target of 80% CO
2
 reduction by mid-century 
by rebuilding the energy system. It considers a Europe 
that electrifi es as much of its energy needs as possible, and 
completely decarbonises that sector. The reference case 
assumes 60% renewables and the remainder split between 
nuclear and clean fossil. One fascinating aspect of this study 
is that it shows it can be done - at least theoretically. The 
plan proposes massive deployment of solar power in the 
Mediterranean belt, and equally massive amounts of wind 
power in the windy north of Europe. In order that this 
produces a working power system, the power transmission grid 
across Europe must be massively strengthened so that supply 
can be matched with demand which may be half a continent 
away. Even then, in order to make up for those odd days when 
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the wind doesn’t blow and the sun doesn’t shine there needs 
to be a very signifi cant amount of back-up gas-fi red power 
plants. The conclusion that is drawn in this study is that an 
unprecedented level of planning, co-ordinated action and 
commitment is needed to make this happen. 
I am not aware of any studies of similar preciseness at world 
scale. Most of what exists at that level still boils down to rather 
crude assertions that there is plenty of renewable potential. 
Much more needs to be done to work this into a plan.
What this overview of the physical aspects of a sustainable energy 
system has made clear is that there are perhaps no hard physical 
limits to what can be achieved by way of a low-carbon energy 
system. There may well be bounds on the time within which we 
can realize this. We certainly cannot do it by 2030. Whether or not 
we can rebuild by 2050 is a more open question. We now know 
how massive the task is, how much material, how much effort, 
how much willingness to spatially accommodate the new energy, 
and how much co-ordinated planning will be needed to realize it. 
In the fi nal analysis this must mean that even to the extent 
that the physical limits can be pushed out, the limit becomes 
a social one. The situation is well summed up in a quote from 
Friedrich von Hayek:
 [There] is little question that almost every one of the technical 
ideals of our experts can be realised within a comparatively 
short period of time if to achieve them were made the sole aim of 
humanity. There is an infi nite number of good things, which we 
all agree are highly desirable as well as possible, but of which we 
cannot hope to achieve more than a few within our lifetime, or 
which we can hope to achieve only very imperfectly.14
The Grand Narrative
On refl ection, this is a most painful observation as it makes 
expert opinion on mere technical feasibility almost irrelevant. 
Knowing a sustainable energy system is possible is one thing. 
The task then becomes to move the task to the top of the priority 
list. Experts will say that the task of rebuilding the energy system 
is an obvious priority in the light of climate change and the 
pivotal role of energy in development and sustaining modern 
life. But other experts will argue for other priorities. Just think 
of health care, clean air, liveable cities, education, a balanced 
budget ... If we follow this line of reasoning to its logical end, 
the question becomes: What is the Grand Narrative that tells 
how humanity might deal with the planetary boundaries while 
simultaneously aspiring for a better life? Grand Narrative is 
a good term to use, I believe. Just as the cathedrals of former 
days were built as the embodiment and expression of religious 
aspirations, so can a sustainable energy system only built - be 
completed - on the basis of an overarching vision, a Grand 
Narrative that gives it a place and a purpose.
Historians and archaeologists who have studied the waxing 
and waning of civilizations over millennia - as opposed to 
those who study only the growth of the past two centuries - 
easily recognise the challenge of sustainable energy for what 
it is, namely a challenge to civilization as a whole, for which 
civilizational renewal is the answer. The great historian Arnold 
Toynbee noted that civilizational renewal, societies’ search for a 
new model, a new set of aspirations, a new Grand Narrative is 
the ultimate and greatest act of human creativity.15 
It is no wonder then, that so many of us who contemplate the 
issue fi nd themselves challenged to paint a clear and concrete 
picture of what new set of aspirations are commensurate with 
sustainable development. Most books on the subject of energy 
and climate change follow a similar pattern. They fi rst make clear 
just how awfully big the challenge is and then present a vision. 
But those visions are without exception either very personal or 
very abstract. Apparently the moment for all this good thinking 
and creativity to congeal into a Grand Narrative hasn’t arrived 
yet. Let me illustrate that by quoting three examples.
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The environmentalist and former presidential advisor James 
Speth refers to the energy/climate challenge as “our Great 
Work”  and observes that it will require “a new consciousness”. 
He quotes scenario work that shows that without a change 
in values all scenarios run into big trouble. He also notes 
that whereas “[i]n the past, leadership most often came from 
scientists, economists and lawyers […], [t]oday we need 
especially the preachers, the philosophers, and the poets”.16
The environmentalist David Orr also calls the climate and 
energy challenge “our Great Work” an as he ponders how to 
achieve it he asks himself: “What is the right narrative for 
our time?” and immediately admits “Frankly I don’t know”. 
But he offers a few suggestions still, one of which is “radical 
hope”, a concept developed to describe how native Americans 
looked out to the future once their ancient hunting grounds 
were gone. The most brave amongst them anticipated a 
future goodness, but still lacked the concepts with which to 
understand it.17
These maybe people whose background associates them most 
naturally with the limits-tradition, but even commentators 
who are arguable closer to the growth-tradition see the need 
for a change in the social sphere. One example is Thomas 
Friedman. His book Hot, Flat and Crowded discusses 
extensively the entrepreneurial opportunities of a future 
“energy internet” providing clean energy. Still, he is explicit 
that none of that will happen - or not nearly enough of it will 
happen - unless there is action at the political level. He points 
numerous times to the democratic defi cit, quoting twice Prof. 
Maniates who has pointed out the fallacy of the business-as-
usual view of “greening”, which is that a lot can be achieved 
through easy, cost-effective actions. And that that is all we can 
hope for anyway since we lack the means to persuade people 
to do anything that “isn’t private, individualistic, cost-effective 
and, above all, easy”. He concludes that “Never has so little 
been asked of so many at such a critical moment.”18  
I interpret these ideas as attempts to reach out towards a 
synthesis. One that allows the constraints of our fi nite planet to 
fi nd their way into the business-as-usual world that is predicated 
on growth. But so far it hasn’t been translated into a program 
that is acceptable to the public, either through their behaviour as 
consumers or through their democratic action as citizens. 
Conclusion
So we come to the inevitable conclusion that the energy 
challenge is both a social and a technical one. I hope that in 
this lecture I have shed some light on how the optimist and 
the pessimist traditions are both relevant in formulating a 
path forward. Climate change is a clear imposition of limits. 
There is only a fi nite budget for CO
2
 emissions left. Before that 
runs out, that is before the middle of the century, we must 
signifi cantly convert the energy system into a low-carbon one. 
New low-carbon technologies will be developed and deployed 
as the optimist tradition would have it: wherever we encounter 
limits, new technology provides the solution. And no doubt it 
will - to a degree. 
But we have also seen that there are limits to the scale and 
speed of deployment which will not go away by technical 
progress. These are social limits on what it takes to implement 
the new technologies at scale and in time. They come in the 
form of prioritization, of planning and co-ordinated action. 
And that will only be possible when our collective views on 
what is feasible and what isn’t, becomes more aligned. 
Clearly, renewables - all renewables - are being deployed 
rapidly - but not nearly rapidly enough to meet the climate 
challenge. Nor is there agreement where the practical limits to 
their deployment lie. In the absence of such agreement, we are 
wavering as to whether or not fossil energy with carbon storage 
or nuclear energy should be part of the future energy mix. Or 
that we should simply reduce our energy consumption. It all 
entails compromises and trade-offs. 
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In the developed world we have grown accustomed to a very 
high level of energy use at the time we were unaware of the big 
trade-off that exists between fossil fuel use and climate change. 
When the deployment of new energy technologies progresses 
from the one-percent to the ten-percent level we should hope 
that opposing pre-analytic visions give way to an agreed 
understanding emerges over what is feasible and what isn’t and 
the trade-offs energy use entails, enabling decisiveness and a 
coherence of vision that is presently lacking. 
We will almost inevitable stay in business-as-usual for a while 
longer, raising the stakes of our bet over climate change. But 
meanwhile we are laying the foundations of the cathedral 
of the future energy system. Here and there the fi rst above-
ground structures are visible in the form of the steady growth 
of renewable energy and pilots for carbon capture and storage. 
The rebuilding of the energy system before 2050 is a project 
of which we do not know if it will exceed our capacity to 
complete it. But as so often with cathedrals, the generation to 
come may fi nd the foundations useful, even as it decides to 
complete the cathedral one size smaller than anticipated. It will 
be… the accidental cathedral. 
Closing remarks
This brings me to the end of my lecture. But before closing I 
would like to briefl y indicate how these thoughts inform my 
plans and activities here at Leiden, and thank a few people.
The story I have told today and the questions it raises is a vital 
part of the curricula on sustainability and sustainable energy, 
which cannot go without a deep analysis and discussion of the 
energy and climate debate. In particular the interplay between 
technical advance and the limits to deployment is a topic of 
my interest. I have given lectures on this topic in the past and 
will continue to do so with much enthusiasm. If the energy 
transition is “our Great Work”, much of it will come down on 
the present generation of students.
As for research, my work at the Institute for Environmental 
Sciences (CML) in collaboration with Gjalt Huppes, René 
Kleijn, Ester van der Voet, Jeroen Guinee and others is aimed at 
quantifi cation of the energy transition through scenario-based 
input-output and life cycle analysis. We also will be looking at 
quantifying the prospects energy technologies that are still in 
their infancy, such as bio-based solar cells that Huub de Groot 
and others are trying to develop. The ultimate aim of this work 
is to give us a better, a more granular picture of the possibilities 
and limits of technical solutions to the energy challenge. As I 
have made clear, such improved understanding will be vital 
to allow society to fi nd out where the balance lies between 
deployment of new technology and social accommodation of 
the planetary boundaries.
In all of this I hope that my role builds a useful bridge between 
academia and industry, between Leiden and Shell. My work 
in Shell exploring energy futures benefi ts from a diversity of 
inputs, including academic insights. Conversely, I hope that 
the university benefi ts from my exposure to the realities of the 
energy business. 
Perhaps not much of that transpired in today’s lecture. The 
setting in this auditorium for once forced me to step away 
from PowerPoint, charts and numbers. This presented an 
interesting challenge and put me naturally in a mode of 
intellectual refl ection, which I hope you enjoyed.
In closing I would like to thank Gjalt Huppes, René Kleijn and 
Geert de Snoo and Sjoerd Verduyn Lunel for inviting me to 
come to Leiden and work at the Institute for Environmental 
Science. I have much enjoyed the atmosphere, the lively 
discussions, the quality of the work and the interaction with 
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